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Abstract. In this thesis, the effects of institutional structure of Turkey on economic 
performance are analyzed by using the notions of transaction cost and credible commitment 
whicharecontributed by the New Institutional Economics (NIE). According to this school, 
neoclassicaleconomics ignores transaction costs, bounded rationality, incomplete contracts, 
andpropertyrights. Hence, neoclassical models can not represent the real world. But it 
iswell-known that the transactioncostsare seldom nil in our daily life. Starting from this 
point of view, we examinethe issues of institutions and NIE and the relationship between 
institutions and economic performance. Then, defining, measuring, and effects of the 
transaction costs arediscussed. Afterwards weanalyze the political transaction costs. Next, 
the policymaking process andcredible commitment are explained. The role of institutions 
on formation of institutionalpolicies, the 3 determiner power(legislative-executive-
judiciary), and the separation of powersare discussed, so that credible commitment is 
clarified in this context. Having underlined the theoreticalframework of these issues, 
Turkey's progress is reviewed. Some of the significant contributionsof thisthesis are 
defining the politicaltransaction cost and credible commitment and after showing the effects 
of Turkey'sinstitutional structure on economic performance by using time series analysis 
with structralbreaks in accordance with the NIE perspective. Our findings indicate that the 
transaction cost and credible commitment are strictly important on investment decisions 
and national income.. 
Keywords. New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost, Credible Commitment, 
Institutional Structure, Investment, Co-integration, Structral Breaks, Turkey. 
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Highlights 
* Effects of corporate structure in Turkey to economic performance are analyzed. 
* Institutions, transaction cost, political process and credible commitment literature is 
reviewed. 
* Simultaneous co-integration with structural-breaks analysis is performed with the data 
obtained from ICRG. 
* As a result, institutional structure in Turkey has an important effect on economic 
performance. 
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Summary 
n this thesis, the relationship between institutional structure and economic 
performance in Turkey is analyzed through transaction cost and credible 
commitment whichareintroducedby the NIE. There is a significant literature 
claiming that the institutional structure in a country specifies the transaction cost 
and the credibility of the economic activity and thus these two variableaffect the 
investment decisions of economic agents (North, 1990; Levy and Spiller, 1996; 
Spiller, 2012). In this context, this thesis aims to define the transaction cost and 
credibility of Turkey’s institutional structure and to show the effects of them on 
investments and economic growth.  
Transaction costs are defined as research and information costs, contract and 
decision costs, monitoring and enforcement costs. The level of the transaction cost 
is determined by the institutional structure. One of the most important factors 
affectingthe institutional structure is political institutions. Political institutions may 
reduce political transaction costs through securing the property rights and enforcing 
contracts. Such an environment would have positive impact on the investment 
decisions and so that economic performance would improve.  
Besides transaction costs, the second important factor affecting the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance is credible commitment. Credible 
commitment determined by political process is one of the main determinants of 
investment decisions. As long as the policymaking process of a country works 
efficiently, credible policies could be constituted. Principally, the institutions 
generating the political process are legislative, executive, and judiciary. If these 
political institutions are operated efficiently, transparently, andharmonized with 
each other,commitment could be credible since the institutional structure will have 
consistency and certainty as working in a perspective of legal based and 
nondiscretionary way.  
When analyzing the changes of Turkey’s institutional structure to date, due to 
the absence of efficient institutions, economic performance follows a discontinuous 
path. The attitude of the state in legal structure and property rights blocks assurance 
of the credible commitment. Although an institutional evolution started in Turkish 
economy during 1980s, because of the problems such as continuous coalitions in 
1990s, not fulfillinginstitutional reforms, stability and balance problems between 
the powers, transaction costs in political process were kept in a high level and the 
investments remained low. On the other hand, the economy gained a positive trend 
with the developments in the institutional structure after 2000s. These were 
stability and fiscal discipline, reform packages for EU target, independent 
regulatory agencies and efficient regulations caused by one-party government.  
Due to the measurement restrictions, in our econometric analysisthe indices 
obtained from ICRG database areutilized to represent these two variables. Political 
risk rating index represents the political transaction cost and investment profile 
index represents the credible commitment.  The data is estimated by Johansen, 
Mosconi and Nielsen (2000) simultaneous cointegration with structural breaks 
approach. The findings of the models, in which three different breaks (internal and 
external) used, comply with our expectations. Accordingly, assurance of 
institutional structure, which makes progress in credible commitment, increases 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Otherwise, if the institutional structure is unable to 
provide credible commitment to agents, FDI decreases. Likewise, minimizing the 
political transaction costs decreases GDP and vice versa. According to the other 
findings, the effects of the interest rate and FDI in Turkey on economic 
performance are in accordance with the economic theory. However, the impact of 
the institutional structure to economic performance is superior to these variables. 
I 
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Additionally, when we comparecoalition and one-party periods, it’s deduced that 
one-party government creates positive effects on economic performance 
byreducingthe transaction costs and increasing the credibility. 
According to these results, the institutional structure of Turkey should 
attentively be designed for getting better economic results. The indicator for 
generating an efficient political process is to compose a mechanism which will 
reducethe transaction costs and increase the credible commitment. 
  
  
References 
Acemoğlu, Daron. 2003. Why not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. Journal of Comparative 
Economics. c.31. s.4: 620-652. 
Acemoğlu, Daron, James Robinson. 2008. The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development. Commision on Growth and 
Development Working Papers. No.10.  
Acemoğlu, Daron, Simon Johnson. 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy. c.113. s.5: 949-995 
Acemoğlu, Daron,  Simon Johnson, James Robinson. 2000. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation. NBER Working Papers. No.w7771.  
Acemoğlu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson. 2005. Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth. Handbook of 
Economic Growth. c.1: 385-472. 
Ahlquist, John S., Aseem Prakash. 2008. The Influence of Foreign Direct Investment on Contracting Confidence in Developing 
Countries. Regulation and Governance. c.2. s.3: 316-339. 
Aidt, Toke S. 2003. Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey*. The Economic Journal. c.113. s.491:  F632-F652. 
Akerlof, George. A. 1970. The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. c.84. s.3: 488-500. 
Akgül, Mehmet Emin. 2010. Kuvvetler Ayrılığı İlkesinin Dönüşümü ve Günümüz Demokratik Rejimlerindeki Anlamı. Ankara 
Barosu Dergisi. c.68 s.4: 79-101. 
Akın, G. Gülsün, Ahmet Faruk Aysan, Levent Yıldıran. 2009. Transformation of the Turkish Financial Sector in the Aftermath of 
the 2001 Crisis. MPRA Working Papers. No.17803.  
Akyol, Taha. 2014. Türkiye’nin Hukuk Serüveni. 1.bs. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap. 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, Romain Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of 
Economic Growth. c.8. s.2: 155-194. 
Alesina, Alberto, Beatrice Weder. 1999.  Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? NBER Working Papers. No.w7108.  
Alesina, Alberto, Şule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, Philip Swagel. 1996. Political Instability and Economic Growth. Journal of 
Economic Growth c.1. s.2: 189-211. 
Alfaro, Laura, Areendam Chanda, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Selin Sayek. 2004. FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local 
Financial Markets. Journal of International Economics, c.64. s.1: 89-112. 
Allen, Douglas W. 1991. What are Transaction Costs? Research in Law and Economics. c.14: 1–18.  
Allen, Douglas W. 1999. Transaction costs. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. c.1.  
Anderson, James E., Leslie Young. 2002. Imperfect Contract Enforcement. NBER Working Papers. No.w8847. 
Aoki, Masahiko. 2007. Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes. Journal of Institutional Economics. c.3. s.01: 1-31. 
Aparicio, Javier F. [11.10.2013]. A Transaction-Cost Politics Framework: Some Basic Notes 
http://investigadores.cide.edu/aparicio/transactioncostpolitics06.pdf  
Ardıyok, Şahin. 2008. Türk Hukukunda Yeni Bir Yaklaşım: Hukuk ve Ekonomi Öğretisi. Uğur Alacakaptan’a Armağan. ed. 
Mehmet Murat İnceoğlu. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Cilt 2. 
Aron, Janine. 2000. Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence. The World Bank Research Observer. c.15. s.1: 99-135. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1969. The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket 
Allocation. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: the PPB system. c.1: 59-73. 
Asiedu, Elizabeth, Yi Jin, Boaz Nandwa. 2009. Does Foreign aid Mitigate the Adverse Effect of Expropriation Risk on Foreign 
Direct Investment? Journal of International Economics. c.78. s.2: 268-275. 
Asoni, Andrea. (2008). Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria. Journal of Economic Surveys. c.22. s.5: 
953-987. 
Atiyas, İzak, Burak Oder. 2008. Türkiye'de Özelleştirmenin Hukuk ve Ekonomisi.  Ankara: TEPAV.  
Auriol, Emmanuell, Robert J. Gary-Bobo. 2007. On Robust Constitution Design. Theory and Decision. c.62. s.3: 241-279. 
Aysan, Ahmet Faruk, Mustapha Nabli K., Marie-Ange Véganzonès-Varoudakis. 2006. Governance and Private Investment in the 
Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. No.3934. 
Baker, Dean, Helen Jorgensen. 2012. The Relationship between Financial Transactions Costs and Economic Growth. CEPR 
Discussion Papers. No.2012-10.  
Baron, David P. 1995. Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives, Agenda and Approaches. Modern Political Economy: 
Old Topics, New Directions. ed. Jeffrey S. Banks, Eric Allen Hanushek. USA: Cambridge University Press: 10-62.  
Barro, Robert J. 1996. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. NBER Working Papers. No.w5698.  
Barzel, Yoram. 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. 1.bs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Baumol, William Junior. 1972. On Taxation and the Control of Externalities. The American Economic Review. c.63. s.3: 307-322. 
Baykal, C. Murat. 2008. Hukuk-Ekonomi İlişkisi ve Ekonomi Hukuku Üzerine. Ankara Barosu Dergisi. c.66. s.4: 76-87.  
Benham, Alexandra, Lee Benham. 2001. The Costs of Exchange. Ronald Coase Institute Working Paper. No.1. 
Bergara, Mario, Witold J. Henisz, Pablo Tomas Spi ller. 1998. Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A 
Cross-Nation Analysis. California Management Review. c.40: 18-35. 
Bevan, Alan A., Saul Estrin. 2004. The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment into European Transition Economies. Journal 
of Comparative Economics. c.3. s.24: 775-787.  
Bjuggren, Per-Olof, & Johan E. Eklund. 2013. Property Rights and the Cost of Capital. European Journal of Law and 
Economics. c.39. s.3: 523-537. 
Boerner, Christopher, Jeffrey Macher. 2001. Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment of the Empirical 
Literature. Basılmamış taslak.  
Brousseau, Eric, Jean-Michel Glachant. 2002. The Economics of Contracts and the Renewal of Economics. The Economis of 
Contracts, Theory and Applications. ed. Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Glachant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 3-
30. 
Buchanan, James M. 1969. Is Economics the Science of Choice? Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek, 
ed. Erich Streissler. New York: Routledge Library Editions: 47-64. 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(1), Y.B. Cicen. p.207-215. 
210 
Buchanan, James M. 1975. A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory. The American Economic Review. c.65. s.2: 
225-230. 
Buchanan, James M. 1987. The Constitution of Economic Policy. The American Economic Review. c.77. s.3: 243-250. 
Buchanan, James M., Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann 
Arbor Paperbacks. Michigan Publishing.  
Buchanan, James M., Robert D. Tollison. 1984. The Theory of Public Choice--II. Michigan University Press.  
Buscaglia, Edgardo, Thomas Ulen. 1997. A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin 
America. International Review of Law and Economics. c.17. s.2: 275-291. 
Busse, Matthias, Carsten Hefeker. 2007. Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment. European Journal of Political 
Economy. c.23. s.2: 397-415. 
Butkiewicz, James L., Halit Yanıkkaya. 2006. Institutional Quality and Economic Growth: Maintenance of the Rule of Law or 
Democratic Institutions, or Both?. Economic Modelling. c.23. s.4: 648-661. 
Carpenter, Robert E., Steven M. Fazzari, Bruce C. Petersen. 1998. Financing Constraints and Inventory Investment: A 
Comparative Study with High-Frequency Panel Data. Review of Economics and Statistics. c.80. s.4: 513-519. 
Cason, Timothy N., Lata Gangadharan. 2003. Transaction Costs in Tradable Permit Markets: An Experimental Study of Pollution 
Market Design. Journal of Regulatory Economics. c.23. s.2: 145–165. 
Cave, Martin & John Stern. 1998. Regulatory Institutions and Regulatory Policy for Economies in Transition. IEA Readings. c.48: 
1-26. 
Checherita-Westphal, Cristina D., Alexander Klemm, Paul Viefers. 2015. Governments' Payment Discipline: The Macroeconomic 
Impact of Public Payment Delays and Arrears. IMF Working Papers. No. WP15/13.  
Cheung, Steven N. 1969. Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements. The Journal of Law and 
Economics. c.12: 23. 
Cheung, Steven N. 1998. The Transaction Costs Paradigm: 1998 Presidential Address Western Economic Association. Economic 
Inquiry. c.36. s.4: 514-521. 
Chiles, Todd H., John F. McMackin. 1996. Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction Cost 
Economics. Academy of Management Review. c.21. s.1: 73-99. 
Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, Mansur Olson. 1996. Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and 
Democracies. Journal of Economic Growth. c.1. s.2: 243-276. 
Coase, Ronald Harry 1937. The Nature Of The Firm. Economica. c.4. s.16: 386-405.  
Coase, Ronald Harry. 1960. Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of the Law and Economics. c.3: 1-44. 
Coase, Ronald Harry. 1988. The Nature of the Firm-Meaning. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. c.4. s.1: 19–32. 
Coase, Ronald Harry. 2002. Interview: Why Economics Will Change?. International Society for New Institutional Economics. c.4. 
s.1: 1-7. 
Collins, Bruce M, Frank J. Fabozzi. 1991. A Methodology for Measuring Transaction Costs. Financial Analysts Journal. c.47. s.2: 
27-36. 
Cooter, Robert, Thomas Ulen. 2011. Law and Economics. 6. bs. Boston: Pearson Education. 
Costantinides, George M., 1986. Capital Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs. The Journal of Political Economy. c.94. s.4: 
842-862.  
Cropper, Maureen, Wallace E. Oats. 1992. Environmental Economics: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature. c.30. s.2: 675–
740. 
Çetin, Tamer. 2007a. Türkiye’de Düzenleyici Sürecin Politik İktisadı. Doktora Tezi. Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler 
Enstitüsü.  
Çetin, Tamer. 2007b. Devletin Ekonomiye Müdahalesinin Kurumsal Maliyeti. Çimento İşveren Dergisi. c.21. s.3: 38-55.  
Çetin, Tamer. 2009. Küreselleşme ve Özelleştirme İlişkisine Eleştirel Bir Bakış: Hukuk ve İktisat Yaklaşımı. Finans ve Ekonomik 
Yorumlar Dergisi. c.46. s.533: 67-82.  
Çetin, Tamer. 2010. İktisadi Etkinlik Üzerine Bir Deneme: X Etkinlik Yaklaşımı. Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi. c.11. s.2: 183-198. 
Çetin, Tamer. 2011. The Role of Institutions over Economic Change in Turkey. Understanding the Process of Economic Change in 
Turkey: An Institutional Approach. ed. Tamer Çetin, Feridun Yılmaz. New York: Nova Science Publishers: 21-39.  
Çetin, Tamer. 2012. Yeni Kurumsal İktisat. Sosyoloji Konferansları. No.45: 43-73. 
Çetin, Tamer. 2013. Toward a New Institutional Economics Theory of Regulation.   
www.yarbis1.yildiz.edu.tr/web/userFiles/dosya6bf700cc5ab7f4651575bebd1d1b7919.pdf [18.06.2013]. 
Çetin, Tamer, Fuat Oğuz. 2007. The Politics of Regulation in the Turkish Electricity Market. Energy Policy. c.35. s.3: 1761-1770. 
Çetin, Tamer, Fuat Oğuz. 2011. Introduction: Regulation and Competition in Turkey. The Political Economy of Regulation in 
Turkey. ed. Tamer Çetin, Fuat Oğuz. New York: Springer: 1-11.   
Dagnino-Pastore, Jose Maria, Paulo Enrico Farina. 1999. Transaction Costs in Argentina. 3-rd Annual Conference of the 
International Society for New Institutional Economics. Washington D.C.: 1-33. 
Dahlman, Carl J. 1979. The Problem of Externality. Journal of Law and Economics. c. 22. S.1: 141-162. 
Daude, Christian, Ernesto Stein. 2007. The Quality of Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment. Economics and Politics. c.19. 
s.3:317-344. 
Dawson, John W. 1998. Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross-Country and Panel Data Evidence. Economic Inquiry. c. 
36: 603-619.  
Demirbağ, Mehmet, Ekrem Tatoğlu, Keith W. Glaister. 2010. Institutional and Transaction Cost Determinants of Turkish MNEs' 
Location Choice. International Marketing Review. c.27. s.3: 272-294. 
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. Towards a Theory of Property Rights. The American Economic Review. c.57. s.2: 347–359. 
Demsetz, Harold. 1968. The Cost of Transacting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. c.82. s.1: 33-53.  
Dickey, David A., Wayne A. Fuller. 1979. Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root. Journal 
of the American Statistical Association. c.74. s.366a: 427-431. 
Dickey, David A., Wayne A. Fuller. 1981. Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit 
Root. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. c.49. s.4: 1057-1072.  
Dietrich, Michael. 1994. Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Towards a New Economics of the Firm. 1. bs. London: 
Routledge. 
Dinçer, Oğuzhan. 2007. The Effects of Property Rights on Economic Performance. Applied Economics. c.39. s.7:825-837. 
Dixit, Avinash K. 1996. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Dobler, Constanze. 2011. The Impact of Formal and Informal Institutions on Economic Growth: A Case Study on the MENA 
Region. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing. 
Dollar, David, Aart Kraay. 2002. Growth is Good for the Poor. Journal of Economic Growth. c.7. s.3: 195-225. 
Dollery, Brian, Wai Ho Leong. 1998. Measuring the Transaction Sector in the Australian Economy, 1911-1991. Australian 
Economic History Review. c.38. s.3: 207–231. 
Dumludağ, Devrim, Ercan Sarıdoğan, Serdar Kurt. 2007. Determinants of Foreign Direct investment: An Institutionalist Approach. 
Seventh Conference of the European Historical Economics Society, 29 June - 1 July 2007. Sweden: Lund University. 
Dunning, John H. 1994. Re-evaluating the Beneﬁts of Foreign Direct Investment. Transnational Corporations. c.3. s.1: 23-51. 
Epstein, David, Sharyn O'Halloran. 1995. A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy. Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization. c.11. s.2: 227-255. 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(1), Y.B. Cicen. p.207-215. 
211 
Epstein, David, Sharyn O'halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under 
Separate Powers. 1.bs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ercan, Metin R., Ziya Öniş. 2001. Turkish Privatization: Institutions and Dilemmas. Turkish Studies. c.2. s.1: 109-34. 
 
Estache, Antonio, David Martimort. 1997. Transaction Costs, Politics and Regulatory Institutions. 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/PDF/WPS2073.PDF [07.10.2013]. 
Estache, Antonio, David Martimort. 1999. Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Papers. No.2073. 
Estache, Antonio,  Liam Wren-Lewis. 2009. Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques 
Laffont's Lead. Journal of Economic Literature. c.47. s.3: 729-770. 
Faroque, Akhter, T. Ton-That. 1995. Financing Constraints and Firm Heterogeneity in Investment Behaviour: An Application Of 
Non-Nested Tests. Applied Economics. c.27. s.3: 317-326.  
Foss, Nicolai J., Klein, Peter G. 2010. Critiques Of Transaction Cost Economics: An Overview. The Elgar Companion to 
Transaction Cost Economics. ed. Peter G. Klein, Michael E. Sykuta. Edward Elgar Publishing. Chapter: 25.     
Furubotn, Eirik Grundtvig, Rudolf Richter. 1991. The New Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal Of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Furubotn, Eirik Grundtvig, Rudolf Richter. 2005. Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics. 2.bs. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Gibbons, Robert. 2010. Transaction‐Cost Economics: Past, Present, and Future? The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. c.112. 
s.2: 263-288. 
Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer. 2004. Do Institutions Cause Growth?. Journal of 
Economic Growth. c.9. s.3: 271-303. 
Gordon, Richard L. 1994. Regulation and Economic Analysis: A Critique Over Two Centuries. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Gow, Hamish. R., Johan F.M. Swinnen. 2001. Private Enforcement Capital and Contract Enforcement in Transition 
Economies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. c.83. s.3: 686-690. 
Gözler, Kemal. 2000. Türkiye’de Hükümetlere Nasıl İstikrar ve Etkinlik Kazandırılabilir? (Başkanlık Sistemi ve 
Rasyonelleştirilmiş Parlâmentarizm Üzerine bir Deneme). Türkiye Günlüğü. s.62: 25-47.  
Gözler, Kemal. 2011. Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş. 18. bs. Bursa: Ekin Yayınevi.  
Gray, Cheryl W., Daniel Kaufmann. 1998. Corruption and Development. Finance and Development. c.1. s.1: 7-10.   
Gu, Bin, Lorin Hitt. 2001. Transaction Costs and Market Efficiency. ICIS 2001 Proceedings. Paper 11: 85-96.  
Hagel, John., Marc Singer. 1999. Net Worth: Shaping Markets When Customers Market the Rules. Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Haggard, Stephan, Lydia Tiede. 2011. The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?. World Development. c.39. s.5: 
673-685. 
Hall, Robert. E., Charles I. Jones. 1999. Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?. NBER 
Working Papers. No.w6564.  
Hart, Oliver, John Moore. 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. c.56. 
s.4: 755-785. 
Hayakawa, Kazunobu, Fukunari Kimura, Hyun-Hoon Lee. 2013. How Does Country Risk Matter for Foreign Direct 
Investment?. The Developing Economies. c.51. s.1: 60-78. 
Heper, Metin. 2000. The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics. Journal of International Affairs. c.54. s.1: 63-82. 
Hicks, John R. 1935. A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money. Economica. c.2. s.5: 1-19. 
Hisamoğlu, Ebru. 2014. EU Membership, Institutions and Growth: The Case of Turkey. Economic Modelling. c.38: 211-219. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey. 1998. The Approach of Institutional Economics. Journal of Economic Literature. c.36. s.1: 166-192. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2000. What is the Essence of Institutional Economics?. Journal of Economic Issues. c.34: 317-329. 
Irion, Kristina, Roxana Radu. 2013. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Authorities in the Media Sector: A Paradigm Shift 
Through the Lens of Regulatory Theory. The Independence of The Media and its Regulatory Agencies. Shedding New Light 
on Formal and Actual Independence Against the National Context. ed. Wolfgang Schulz, Peggy Valcke, Kristina Irion. 
Chicago: Intellect Publishers: 15-54. 
Isham, Jonathan., Daniel Kaufmann, Lant H. Pritchett. 1997. Civil Liberties, Democracy, and The Performance of Government 
Projects. The World Bank Economic Review. c.11. s.2: 219-242. 
Johansen, Søren. 1988. Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. c.12. s.2: 231–
254. 
Johansen, Soren, Rocco Mosconi, Bent Nielsen. 2000. Cointegration Analysis in The Presence of Structural Breaks in the 
Deterministic Trend. The Econometrics Journal.  c.3. s.2: 216-249. 
Joskow, Paul L. 1991. The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies. Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization. c.7: 121–155. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi. 2011. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical 
Issues. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. c.3. s.02: 220-246. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 2002. Governance Matters II: Updated Governance Indicators for 2000-
01. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No.2772. 
Keefer, Philip. 2007. Beyond Legal Origin and Checks and Balances: Political Credibility, Citizen Information, and Financial 
Sector Development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No.4154. 
Keyman, Fuat. 2009. Küreselleşen Dünyada Türkiye ve Demokratikleşme: Süreçler, Sorunlar, Aktörler. Bilgesam Rapor No.7. 
http://www.uhim.org/raporlar_detay.php?rid=41&cid=3 [14.02.2015]. 
Khalil, Mahmoud, Shereef Ellaboudy, Arthur Denzau. 2007. The Institutions and Economic Development in the 
OECD. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics. c.12: 67-79. 
Khan, Mashrur Mustaque, Mashfique Ibne Akbar. 2013. The Impact of Political Risk on Foreign Direct Investment. International 
Journal of Economics and Finance. c.5. s.8: 147. 
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2004. State Failure in Developing Countries and Institutional Reform Strategies. Toward Pro-Poor Policies. 
Aid, Institutions, and Globalization. ed. Bertil Tungodden, Nicholas Herbert Stern, Ivar Kolstad. Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics. Washington, Oxford: the World Bank, Oxford University Press: 165-195.  
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2005. What is a "Good Investment Climate"?, Investment Climate, Growth, and Poverty. ed. Kochendörfer-
Lucius, Gudrun, Boris Pleskovic. Washington D.C.: World Bank: 77-86.  
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2007. Governance and Growth: A Preliminary Report. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9958/1/Preliminary_Report.pdf 
[12.05.2015]. 
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2012. Governance and Growth: History, Ideology and Methods of Proof. Good Growth and Governance in 
Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies. ed. Akbar Noman, Kwesi Botchwey, Howard Stein, Joseph E. Stiglitz. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 51-79. 
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2013. Political Settlements and the Design of Technology Policy. The Industrial Policy Revolution II: Africa in 
the Twenty-first Century. ed. Joseph Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin, Ebrahim Patel. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 243-280. 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(1), Y.B. Cicen. p.207-215. 
212 
Kherallah, Mylene, Johann F. Kirsten. 2002. The New Institutional Economics: Applications for Agricultural Policy Research in 
Developing Countries. Agricultural Economics Research, Policy and Practice in Southern Africa. c.41. s.2: 110-133. 
Kibritçioğlu, Aykut. 2001. Economic Crisis and the Governments in Turkey, 1969-2001. Yeni Türkiye Dergisi. c.1. s.7: 174-182.  
Klaes, Matthias. 2000. The Birth of the Concept of Transaction Costs: Issues and Controversies. Industrial and Corporate Change. 
c.9. s.4: 567–593.  
Klein, Benjamin. 1998. Hold-up Problem. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. ed. Peter Newman. 
Macmillan Reference Limited: c.2, 241. 
Klein, Peter G. 2000. New Institutional Economics. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 1. Aldershott, UK: Edward Elgar: 456-
489. 
Knack, Stephen, Philip Keefer. 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country Tests Using Alternative Institutional 
Measures. Economics and Politics. c.7. s.3: 207-227.  
Kolstad, Ivar, Espen Villanger. 2008. Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Services. European Journal of Political 
Economy. c.24. s.2: 518-533. 
Krey, Matthias. 2005. Transaction Costs of Unilateral CDM Projects in India: Results From An Empirical Survey. Energy Policy.  
c.33. s.18: 2385–2397. 
Kwiatkowski, Denis, Peter C. B. Phillips, Peter Schmidt, Yongcheol Shin. 1992. Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity 
Against the Alternative of a Unit Root: How Sure Are We That Economic Time Series Have a Unit Root?. Journal of 
Econometrics. c.54. s.1: 159-178. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer. 2004. Judicial Checks and Balances. Journal 
of Political Economy. c.112. s.2: 445-470.   
Laffont, Jean-Jacques. 2005. Regulation and Development. 1. bs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, David Martimort. 1998. Transaction Costs, Institutional Design and the Separation of Powers. European 
Economic Review. c.42. s.3: 673-684. 
Lai, Lawrence W.C. 1997. Property Rights Justification for Planning and a Theory of Zoning. Progress in Planning. c.48. s.3: 161–
246. 
Law, Siong Hook, Thong Cheen Lim, Normaz Wana Ismail. 2013. Institutions and Economic Development: A Granger Causality 
Analysis of Panel Data Evidence. Economic Systems. c.37. s.4: 610-624. 
Lee, Junsoo, Mark C. Strazicich. 2003. Minimum Lagrange Multiplier Unit Root Test with Two Structural Breaks. Review of 
Economics and Statistics. c.85. s.4: 1082-1089. 
Lee, Junsoo, Mark C. Strazicich. 2004. Minimum LM Unit Root Test with One Structural Break. Appalachian State University, 
Department of Economics: Working Paper Series. No.04-17.   
Levy, Brian, Pablo T. Spiller. 1994. The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of 
Telecommunications Regulation. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. c.10. s.2: 201-246. 
Levy, Brian, Pablo T. Spiller. 1996. Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Libecap, Gary D. 1986. Property Rights in Economic History: Implications For Research. Explorations in Economic History. c.23. 
s.3: 227-252. 
Lueck, Dean, Thomas J. Miceli. 2007. Property Law. Handbook of Law and Economics Volume 1. 1. bs. ed. A.Mitchell Polinsky, 
Steven Shavell. UK: Elsevier: 183-258.  
Luo, Yadong. 2005. Transactional Characteristics, Institutional Environment and Joint Venture Contracts. Journal of International 
Business Studies. c.36. s.2: 209-230. 
Macher, Jeffrey T, Barak D. Richman. 2008. Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social 
Sciences. Business and Politics. c.10. s.1: Article 1.  
Maher, Maria E. 1997. Transaction Cost Economics and Contractual Relations. Cambridge Journal of Economics. c.21. s.2: 147-
170. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1985. Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. c.100. s.2: 529-537. 
Mardin, Şerif. 2000. Center-Periphery Relations: A Key in the Turkish Politics. Political Change and Modernization in Turkey. ed. 
Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay. İstanbul: Alfa: 79-104. 
Marinescu, Cosmin.  2012. Transaction Costs and Institutions' Efficiency: A Critical Approach. American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology. c.71. s.2: 254-276. 
Masron, Tajul Ariffin, Hussin Abdullah. 2010. Institutional Quality as a Determinant for FDI Inflows: Evidence from 
ASEAN. World Journal of Management. c.2. s.3: 115-128. 
Masten, Scott E., Stephane Saussier. 2000. Econometrics of Contracts: An Assessment of Developments in The Empirical 
Literature on Contracting. Revue D'économie Industrielle. c.92. s.1: 215-236. 
Matthews, Robin C.O. 1986. The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth. Economic Journal. c.96. s.384: 903-918. 
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. c.110. s.3: 681-712. 
McCann, Laura, Bonnie Colby, K.William Easter, Alexander Kasterine, K. Viswanathan Kuperan. 2005. Transaction Cost 
Measurement for Evaluating Environmental Policies. Ecological Economics. c.52. s.4: 527-542. 
Menard, Сlaude, Mary M. Shirley. 2008. The Handbook of New Institutional Economics. 2. bs. ed. Claude Menard Сlaude, Mary 
M. Shirley. US: Springer: 1-18.   
Meyer, Klaus E. 2001. Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Entry Mode Choice in Eastern Europe. Journal of International 
Business Studies. c.32. s.2: 357-367. 
Meyer, Thomas. 2006. Economic Development and Endogenous Quality of Institutions. Doktora Tezi. Freie Universität Berlin. 
Miller, Gary. 2000. Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in The Design of Public Agencies. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. c.10. s.2: 289-328. 
Mishra, Anil, Kevin James Daly. 2007. Effect of Quality of Institutions on Outward Foreign Direct Investment. The Journal of 
International Trade and Economic Development. c.16. s.2: 231-244. 
Moe, Terry. 1990. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy. Organization Theory: From Chester 
Barnard to the Present and Beyond. ed. Oliver Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 116-153. 
Moe, Terry. 1997. The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy. Perspectives on Public Choice. ed. Dennis C. Mueller. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 455-480. 
Murray, Janet Y. 2001. Strategic Alliance-Based Global Sourcing Strategy for Competitive Advantage: A Conceptual Framework 
and Research Propositions. Journal of International Marketing. c.9. s.4: 30-58. 
Musole, Maliti. 2009. Property Rights, Transaction Costs and Institutional Change: Conceptual Framework And Literature 
Review. Progress in Planning. c.71. s.2: 43-85. 
Ng, Serena, Pierre Perron. 2001. Lag Length Selection and The Construction of Unit Root Tests with Good Size and 
Power. Econometrica. c. 69. s.6: 1519-1554. 
Nooteboom, Bart. 1993. Research Note: An Analysis Of Specificity İn Transaction Cost Economics. Organization Studies. c.14. 
s.3: 443-451. 
North, Douglass C. 1984. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics. c. 140. s.1: 7-17. 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(1), Y.B. Cicen. p.207-215. 
213 
North, Douglass C. 1986. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.  c. 142. s.1: 230-
237. 
North, Duglass C. 1987. Institutions, Transaction costs and Economic growth. Economic Inquiry. c.25. s.3: 419-428. 
North, Douglass C. 1990a. Institutions, Institutional Change, And Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
North, Douglass C. 1990b. A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics. c.2. s.4: 355-367. 
North, Douglass C. 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives. c.5. s.1: 97–112. 
North, Douglass C. 1992. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic Performance. San Francisco, California: ICS Press. 
North, Douglass C. 1993. Institutions and Credible Commitment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. c.149. s.1: 
11-23. 
North, Douglass C. 1994. Economic Performance Through Time. The American Economic Review. c.84. s.3: 359-368. 
North, Douglass C. 1995. The New Institutional Economics and Development. The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development. ed. John Harris, Janet Hunter ve Colin M. Lewis. London: Routlege: 17-27. 
North, Douglass C. 1997. The Process of Economic Change. World Institute for Development Economics Research. Research 
Paper 128. 
North, Douglass C. 2003. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting 
Economic Growth. Forum 7: 1-21.  
North, Douglass C., Weingast, Barry R. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public 
Choice in Seventeenth-century England. The Journal of Economic History. c.49. s.04: 803-832. 
Nye, John. 2008. Institutions And The Institutional Environment. New Institutional Economics, A Guidebook. ed. Eric Brosseau, 
Jean Michel Glachant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 67-81. 
OECD. 2002a. Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance. Paris: OECD 
Publishing.  
OECD. 2002b. OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey 2002. Paris: OECD Publishing Press. 
OECD. 2008. OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey 2008. Paris: OECD Publishing Press. 
Oğuz, Fuat. 2011. Devlet ve Piyasa: Regülâsyon Ekonomisine Giriş. 1. bs. Ankara: Seçkin Yayınları. 
Oktay, Cemil. 1984. Kuvvetler Ayrılığı İlkesinin Yargı Açısından Anlamı Ve Türkiye Örneği. Anayasa Yargısı Dergisi. c.1: 215-
242. 
Olson Jr, Mancur, Naveen Sarna, Anand V. Swamy. 2000. Governance And Growth: A Simple Hypothesis Explaining Cross-
Country Differences in Productivity Growth. Public Choice. c.102 s.3/4: 341-364. 
Olson, Mary K. 1999. Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance. Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization. c.15. s.3: 573-601.  
Öniş, Ziya. 2003. Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics: Towards a Political Economy of the 2000 and 2001 Financial Crises 
in Turkey. The Turkish Economy in Crisis. ed. Ziya Öniş, Barry Rubin. London: Frank Cass: 1-30. 
Özdemir, Ali Murat, Muammer Ketizmen. 2014. Giriş ya da Sonuç Yerine 1: Yeni Teşebbüsleri Beklerken. Türkiye’nin Hukuk 
Sisteminde Yapısal Dönüşüm. ed. Ali Murat Özdemir, Muammer Ketizmen. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi: 15-44. 
Özveren, Eyüp. 2007. Kurumsal İktisat: Aralanan Karakutu. Kurumsal İktisat. ed. Eyüp Özveren. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.  
Pamuk, Şevket. 2007. Dünyada ve Türkiye’de İktisadi Büyüme (1820-2005). Uluslararası Ekonomi ve Dış Ticaret Politikaları. c.1. 
s.2:3-26. 
Pamuk, Şevket. 2010. Economic Growth and Institutional Change in Turkey before 1980. Understanding the Process of Economic 
Change in Turkey: An Institutional Analysis. ed. Tamer Çetin ve Feridun Yılmaz. New York: NOVA Science Publishers: 15-
30. 
Pamuk, Şevket. 2014. Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi. 1. bs. İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları. 
Perron, Pierre. 1989. The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis. Econometrica. c.57. s.6: 1361-1401. 
Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini. 2007. The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogenous and How Can it be Estimated?. 
NBER Working Papers. No.w13150.  
Phillips, Peter C., Pierre Perron. 1988. Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression. Biometrika. c.75. s.2: 335-346. 
Polatoğlu, Aykut. 2009. Türk Kamu Yönetimi: Güncel ve Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım. 1.bs. Lefkoşa: Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi 
Yayınları. 
Pollak, Robert A. 1985. A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households. Journal of economic Literature. c.23. s.2: 581-
608. 
Polski, Margaret M. 2001. Measuring Transaction Costs and Institutional Change in the US Commercial Banking Industry. 
Institute for Development Strategies Discussion Papers. ISSN 01-3. January.  
Przeworski, Adam, Fernando Limongi. 1993. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. c.7. 
s.3: 51-69. 
Rawdanowicz, Łukasz. 2010. The 2008-09 Crisis in Turkey: Performance, Policy Responses and Challenges for Sustaining the 
Recovery”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers. No.819.  
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses. Journal of Economic 
Growth. c.4. s.4: 385-412. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2000. Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them?. Studies in Comparative 
International Development. c.35. s.3: 3-31. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. 1. bs. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2008. The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. c.39. s.2: 365-412. 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy Of Institutions Over Geography and 
Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth. c.9. s.2: 131-165. 
Rutherford, Malcolm. 2001. Institutional Economics: Then and Now. Journal of Economic Perspectives. c.15. s.3: 173-194. 
Sara, Tejinder S., Benjamin Newhouse. 1995. Transaction Costs and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries. International Advances in Economic Research. c.1. s.4: 317-325. 
Scartascini, Carlos. 2007. The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions. Inter-American Development Bank Research 
Department Working Paper Series. No.580. 
Schaller, Huntley. 1993. Asymmetric Information, Liquidity Constraints and Canadian Investment. Canadian Journal of 
Economics. c.26. s.3: 552-574. 
Schmidt, Peter, Peter C. Phillips. 1992. Lm Tests For a Unıt Root In The Presence Of Deterministic Trends*. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics. c.54. s.3: 257-287. 
Seabra, Fernando, Lisandra Flach. 2005. Foreign Direct Investment and Profit Outflows: A Causality Analysis for the Brazilian 
Cconomy. Economics Bulletin. c.6. s.1: 1-15. 
Sezen, Seriye. 2007. Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey: Are They Really Autonomous?.  Public Administration and 
Development. c.27. s.4: 319-332. 
Shelanski, Howard A., Peter G. Klein. 1995. Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. c.11. s.2: 335–361. 
Simon, Herbert. 1957. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on 
Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. ed. Herbert Simon. New York: Wiley. 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(1), Y.B. Cicen. p.207-215. 
214 
Smyth, Russell. 1998. New Institutional Economics in The Post-Socialist Transformation Debate. Journal of Economic 
Surveys. c.12. s.4: 361-398. 
Soloman, B. 1999. New Directions in Emission Trading: The Potential Contribution of New Institutional Economics. Ecological 
Economics. c.30, 371–387. 
Spiller, Pablo. 1995. Regulatory Commitment and Utilities’ Privatization: Implications for Future Comparative Research. Modern 
Political Economy, Old Topics, New Directions. ed. Jeffrey Banks, Eric Hanusheck. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Spiller, Pablo T. 1999. Institutions and Commitment. Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies: The Transaction Costs Economics 
Perspective. ed. Glenn R. Carroll, David J.Teece. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 279-310. 
Spiller, Pablo T. 2010. Regulation: A Transaction Cost Perspective. California Management Review. c.52. s.2: 147-158. 
Spiller, Pablo T. 2013. Transaction Cost Regulation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. c.89(C): 232-242. 
Spiller, Pablo T., Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi. 2003. Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes: An 
Intertemporal Transactions Framework. http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/cedi/dts/dt81.pdf  [03.11.2014]. 
Spiller, Pablo T., Mariano Tommasi. 2003. The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with 
Application to Argentina. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. c.19. s.2: 281-306. 
Spiller, Pablo T., Mariano Tommasi. 2005. The Institutions of Regulation: An Application To Public Utilities. Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics. ed. Claude Menard, Mary M. Shirley. Berlin: Springer: 515-543.  
Stavins, Robert N. 1995. Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. c.29. 
s.2: 133–148. 
Stein, Ernesto, Mariano Tommasi, Carlos Scartascini, Pablo T. Spiller. 2008. Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes 
Policies. Washington, D.C: IDB Publications. 
Stern, John. 1997. What Makes an Independent Regulator Independent. Business Strategy Review. c.8. s.2: 67-74. 
Stern, John, Stuart Holder. 1999. Regulatory Governance: Criteria for Assessing the Performance of Regulatory Systems: An 
Application to Infrastructure Industries in the Developing Countries of Asia. Utilities Policy. c.8. s.1: 33-50. 
Suavi, Aydın, Yüksel Taşkın. 2014. 1960’dan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi. 1. bs. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık. 
Svensson, Jakob. 1998. Investment, Property rights and Political Instability: Theory and Evidence. European Economic 
Review. c.42. s.7: 1317-1341. 
Tabellini, Guido. 2008. Presidential Address: Institutions and Culture. Journal of the European Economic Association, c.6. s.2/3: 
255-294. 
Thatcher, Mark. 2000. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe. Governance. c.13. s.1: 25-43. 
Thatcher, Mark. 2002. Regulation after Delegation: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe.  Journal of European Public 
Policy. c.9. s.6: 954-972. 
Thatcher, Mark. 2005. The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe. Governance. c.18. 
s.3: 347-374. 
Thompson, Dale B. 1998. The Institutional-Transaction-Cost Framework for Public Policy Analysis. Washington University 
Working Papers. No.OLIN-97-19.   
Tietenberg, Tom. 2006. Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. 7. bs. Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley. 
Tirole, Jean. 1994. The Internal Organization of Government. Oxford Economic Papers. No.46: 1-29. 
Tirole, Jean. 1999. Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?. Econometrica. c.67. s.4: 741-781. 
Tornell, Aaron. 1997. Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights. Journal of Economic Growth. c.2. s.3: 
219-250. 
TÜSİAD. 2001. Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri ve AB Kopenhag Siyasal Kriterleri. Rapor No.T/2001-05/3002001. 
İstanbul.   
TÜSİAD. 2002. Bağımsız Düzenleyici Kurumlar ve Türkiye Uygulaması.  Rapor No. T/2002-12/349. İstanbul.  
TÜSİAD. 2003. Türkiye’de Düzenleyici Reformlar: Yaşamsal Dönüşüme Destek. Rapor No.T/2003/9/359. İstanbul.   
Uğur, Mehmet. 2010. Institutions and Economic Performance: A Review of the Theory and 
Evidence. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102746  [27.04.2014] 
Ulusoy, Ali, Fuat Oğuz. 2007. The Privatization of Electricity Distribution in Turkey: A Legal and Economic Analysis. Energy 
Policy. c.35. s.10: 5021-5034. 
Vannoni, Davide. 2002. Empirical Studies of Vertical Integration: The Transaction Cost Orthodoxy. International Review of 
Economics and Business. c.49. s.1: 113-41. 
 
Voigt, Stefan, Nora El-Bialy. 2013. Identifying the Determinants of Judicial Performance: Taxpayers’ Money Well 
Spent?. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241224 [11.02.2013] 
Voyvoda Ebru, Erinç Yeldan. 2001. Patterns of Productivity Growth and the Wage Cycles in Turkish Manufacturing. International 
Review of Applied Economics. c.15. s.4: 375-396. 
Wallis, John J., Douglass C. North. 1986. Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970. Long-term 
Factors in American Economic Growth. ed. Stanley L. Engerman, Robert E. Gallman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 
95-162.  
Wang, Ning. 2003. Measuring Transaction Costs: An Incomplete Survey. Ronald Coase Institutes Working Paper Series. No.2. 
Wang, Ning. 2007. Measuring Transaction Costs: Diverging Approaches, Contending Practices. Division of Labour and 
Transaction Costs, c.2. s.2: 111-146. 
Webster, Christopher J., Lawrance Wai-Chung Lai. 2003. Property Rights, Planning and Markets: Managing Spontaneous Cities. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Whited, Toni M. 1992. Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from panel data. The Journal of 
Finance. c.47. s.4: 1425-1460.  
Williamson, Claudia. R., Carrie B. Kerekes. 2011. Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions. Journal of Law 
and Economics. c.54. s.3: 537-572. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis of Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.  
Williamson, Oliver E. 1979. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Law and 
Economics. c.22. s.2: 233-261. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology. 
c.87. s.3: 548-577. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.  
Williamson, Oliver E. 1986. Economic Organisation: Firms, Markets and Policy Control. New York: New York University Press.  
Williamson, Oliver E. 1989. Transaction Cost Economics. Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. Richard Schmalensee, Robert 
Willig. Volume 1: 135-182. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1990. A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization. Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics. c.146. s.1: 61-71. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1993. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. Journal of Law and Economics. c.36. s.1: 453-
486. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1998. Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed. De Economist. c.146. s.1: 23–58. 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(1), Y.B. Cicen. p.207-215. 
215 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1999. Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, c.15. s.1: 306-342. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature. 
c.38. s.3: 595–613. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 2002. The Theory of The Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. c.16. s.3: 171-195. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 2005. The Economics of Governance. American Economic Review. c. 95. s.2: 1-18. 
Wink Junior, Marcos Vinício, Hsia Hua Sheng, William Eid Junior. 2011. Transaction Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Their 
Relationship With Investment and Foreign Direct Investment. Revista De Administração De Empresas. c.51. s.2:175-187.  
Wood, B. Dan, John Bohte. 2004. Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design. Journal of Politics. c.66. 
s.1: 176-202. 
Yalçınkaya, Timuçin, Nergis Melis Durcan. 2011. The Institutional Basis of the Socioeconomic Situation of Turkey in The 
Context Of Globalization. Uludağ Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi. c.30. s.1: 95-112.  
Yamamura, Eiji. 2013. Public Sector Corruption and the Probability of Technological Disasters. Economics of Governance. c.14. 
s.3: 233-255.  
Yılmaz, Feridun. 2007. Avrupa’da Kurumsal İktisat: G.M. Hodgson Örneği. Kurumsal İktisat. ed. Eyüp Özveren. Ankara: İmge. 
Younas, Javed. 2009. Does Institutional Quality Affect Capital Mobility? Evidence from Developing Countries. Journal of 
Institutional Economics. c.5. s:2: 207-223. 
Zattler, Jürgen K. 2002. Growth Policies in Developing Countries. Intereconomics. c.37. s.4: 212-222. 
Zivot, Eric, Donald W. Andrews. 1992. Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-Price Shock, and the Unit-Root. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics. c.10. s.3: 251-270. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
